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Most literature produced in the past two decades on the prospects of intervention to
prevent genocide can be summed up by a cliche´: ‘‘Where there’s a will, there’s a
way.’’1 In that context, a vital if imperfect corrective is provided by MARO: Mass
Atrocity Response Operations; A Military Planning Handbook (henceforth, MARO),
produced jointly by Harvard University and the US Army. Contrary to the naı¨ve
optimism of many past analyses, this report starts with the fact that, without feasible
options, effective humanitarian military intervention is unlikely, if not impossible.
As MARO makes clear from the outset, ‘‘the failure to act in the face of mass
killings of civilians is not simply a function of political will or legal authority; the
failure also reflects a lack of thinking about how military forces might respond.’’2
Accordingly, the report details precisely how such forces could intervene, in hopes
that they will be better prepared and more likely to act in future crises. The report’s
guiding ethos could thus be summed up by reversing the cliche´: ‘‘Where there’s a
way, there’s a will.’’
By focusing on practical matters, rather than wishful thinking, MARO is a vast
improvement over the 2008 report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force, chaired by
Madeleine Albright and William Cohen, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S.
Policymakers.3 Unlike that previous report, MARO lays out an impressive spectrum
of realistic military options, ranging from deterrent threats to full-blown military
occupation, which could prevent or mitigate genocide (20; 65–87). The new report
also includes the dry doctrinal language that would be necessary for a huge bureau-
cracy like the US military to implement such a policy.
MARO builds upon three important lessons from the past (17–18). First, inter-
vention creates a strategic interaction between at least three players—the two (or
more) parties involved in the conflict plus the interveners—so its precise consequences
are unpredictable (25–26). Second, intervention is almost never neutral. Even if
interveners provide aid impartially—that is, to all sides based exclusively on
need—they inevitably will alter the balance of power in a conflict.4 Third, wide-
spread killing and expulsion can be, and often are, perpetrated remarkably quickly,
so if intervention builds only gradually—as the domestic politics of the intervening
states typically necessitate—it will likely fail to prevent such atrocities (29).5
The report then addresses stubborn military realities (18). For example, in air-
borne interventions especially, there is an unavoidable trade-off between the speed
of deployment and the weight of armor and equipment used to protect intervening
forces. In other words, it takes longer to deploy well-protected forces. Yet, quicker
interventions can save more lives. As a result, there is also a painful trade-off
between how many potential victims will be protected and how many interveners
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will be killed or wounded in the process. Hypothetically, a lighter intervening force—
that is, one without armored vehicles, helicopters, and artillery—might deploy three
times as fast and save 10,000 more lives, but at the cost of 50 more intervener
casualties. Would such a trade-off be worthwhile? Who should decide? MARO does
not answer such questions or even explore them in detail, but deserves credit for
acknowledging them rather than pretending, as have many previous analyses, that
all such challenges can be overcome by political will.
MARO also astutely recommends advance planning for specific military inter-
ventions. Very few countries actually are at risk of genocidal violence, and experts
are generally able to identify them.6 If military planning teams were provided
several months to research past patterns of violence and current political trends in
these states, they would be able to pinpoint the most likely perpetrators and targets
of atrocities, the locations and means of entry for interveners, the potential staging
bases in neighboring states, and the best strategies to stanch violence. Such advance
planning would make intervention much faster and more effective when and if
deployment orders ever came, potentially saving tens or even hundreds of thousands
more lives in a case such as the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.
Full-blown intervention is not the only type that can prevent atrocities, as
the report accurately observes, because smaller-scale deterrent operations also can
decisively affect outcomes (65–69). An excellent example, not cited in MARO, took
place in Liberia in 2003. The mere deployment of US Marines off the coast—
accompanied by military over-flights, deft diplomacy, a regional peacekeeping con-
tingent, and a small evacuation force—successfully persuaded President Charles
Taylor to leave office, thereby ending a savage civil war and alleviating a humanitarian
emergency for tens of thousands of displaced civilians.7
Despite these many attributes, MARO is marred by two shortcomings. First, it
focuses mainly on military operations to the relative neglect of political strategies
and consequences. Second, it often relies on a simplistic, idealized conflict scenario,
giving rise to intervention proposals that could backfire in more realistic and com-
plex settings. Although MARO refers in passing to ‘‘second-order’’ (40; 52; 68) and
‘‘third-order’’ (27; 40) effects of military intervention,8 it largely ignores the implica-
tions of such ‘‘system effects,’’ which, as Robert Jervis has noted, can radically alter
policy prescriptions.9 The report explicitly avoids complex policy questions about
intervention, stating that ‘‘The MARO Project itself is concerned with answering
the ‘how,’ not the ‘whether’ ’’ (13). Unfortunately, since military intervention can
unintentionally increase the likelihood of atrocities, the ‘‘how’’ of intervention is
inextricably linked to debates about ‘‘whether’’ such action is advisable.
Strategy versus Operations
The Prussian military officer Carl von Clausewitz famously noted that war is ‘‘a
continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means.’’10 While this
dictum is well known, its policy implications are less widely understood. Clausewitz
was criticizing the tendency—still prevalent today—of war planning to focus more
on military operations than on the achievement of underlying political objectives.
Essentially, he warned against winning the battle while losing the war. Or, as he
summed it up, military ‘‘means can never be considered in isolation from their
purpose.’’11
Modern scholars and practitioners of military arts have institutionalized this
lesson via an analytical prism comprising three levels of analysis that represent
progressively wider scope: tactics, operations, and strategy. Tactics refer to the ways
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in which force is utilized locally to achieve small-scale military objectives. Operations
refer to the ways in which tactics are utilized on a wider scale to achieve broader
military objectives. Strategy refers to the ways in which military operations are
utilized to achieve political objectives.
MARO, as its title indicates, focuses on military operations. This is necessary,
but not sufficient. Since the advent of widespread humanitarian military inter-
vention in the 1990s, such operations have frequently backfired strategically, by
increasing civilian suffering, contrary to their political objective. From a Clausewitzian
perspective, interveners often win the battle but lose the war. For example, in 1999,
NATO bombing accomplished its military objective by compelling the retreat of
Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. But it failed strategically by unintentionally amplifying
the killing and expulsion of ethnic Albanian civilians—five-fold, at minimum—and
then enabling the revenge killing and expulsion of ethnic Serb civilians.12 This
outcome was precisely opposite to NATO’s stated humanitarian objective of pro-
tecting civilians.
The only way to avert such perverse outcomes is to design military operations
with an eye to strategy based on realistic scenarios that draw upon accurate descrip-
tions of past interventions. Unfortunately, here too MARO sometimes falls short.
White and Black Hats
The greatest flaw of MARO is that it assumes that most atrocities are committed in
the context of one-way violence by a state against its civilians. The report thus views
intervention as having the straightforward effect of stopping the bad guys and protect-
ing the good guys, with assistance from non-governmental and multilateral organiza-
tions.13 As it summarizes, ‘‘The four categories [of actors] include: perpetrators,
victims, interveners, and a more nebulous group of ‘others’ ’’ (44).
In reality, as scholars have long documented but only recently emphasized, most
atrocities by states are committed in response to rebel challenges, including armed
secession. States typically target civilians who are suspected of supporting, harbor-
ing, or secretly being rebels. From 1943 to 1987, Harff and Gurr identified 44
episodes of ‘‘genocide and politicide,’’ state-sponsored campaigns lasting at least six
months that deliberately killed thousands of noncombatants.14 In 30 of those 44
cases (68%), as I observed in a 2005 analysis, rebels provoked the state’s retaliation
against civilians.15 In a separate study, Helen Fein identified 19 cases of genocide
from 1945 to 1988. She similarly concluded that ‘‘one could classify at least 11 cases
[58%] as retributive genocide in which the perpetrators retaliated to a real or
perceived threat by the victim to the structure of domination.’’16 In a more recent
quantitative analysis, Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay
likewise find that atrocities are best explained as a state strategy to ‘‘drain the sea’’
of rebels.17
Because of these complex dynamics, international efforts to protect at-risk
civilians, as called for by the emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect, can
perversely backfire by exacerbating violence. This is so because intervention to
defend targeted civilians, whether through military or diplomatic action, often has
the effect of also protecting and assisting rebels. This emboldens the rebels to
escalate their attacks against the state, provoking still greater atrocities. In some
cases, rebels even deliberately provoke state retaliation against civilians to attract
international intervention. Over the last two decades, this moral-hazard dynamic
has exacerbated atrocities in three of the worst cases: Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur.18
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A pre-publication draft of MARO failed almost entirely to contemplate this
dynamic. Only one sentence in an appendix noted that international deterrent
operations ‘‘may inspire opposition groups to increase any activities that may have
been contributing to the situation and prompt a harsh governmental response.’’
Following comments from me (and perhaps others), MARO moved that sentence
into the main text and added that opposition groups may try to ‘‘manipulate an
intervention by external parties’’ (68). The final report also warns that ‘‘rebel groups
may conduct mass atrocities to intimidate populations, undermine the government’s
legitimacy, or provoke the government into a disproportionate response’’ (45). These
are important correctives. But MARO still fails to address the implications for
strategy, because it focuses nearly exclusively on military operations.19 As a result,
the report prescribes military action that could mitigate some atrocities but might
exacerbate others, thereby potentially increasing the total violence against civilians,
constituting strategic failure.
The report’s simple scenario of good versus bad guys also distorts lessons from
the past. In Rwanda, for example, MARO explains the victimization of both of
the country’s main ethnic groups as follows: ‘‘Rwandan [Hutu] genocidaires killed
moderate Hutu in addition to Tutsi’’ (39). This ignores long-standing evidence that
the invading Tutsi rebels, known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front, themselves killed
tens of thousands of Rwandan Hutu civilians before, during, and after the genocide,
thereby helping provoke and fuel the massacres by Hutu extremists.20 Ironically, the
report cites only the Hutu for using media ‘‘to attempt to control, or decisively shape,
the information environment’’ (55). In actuality, worldwide media reported Hutu
crimes within weeks but failed to report Tutsi crimes for nearly 15 years because
the propaganda of the rebels successfully blamed the Hutu for all atrocities and
impeded UN investigations. MARO, in this instance, falls victim to precisely the
kind of information operations that it warns against.
The history of rebel provocation also calls into question the report’s policy pre-
scriptions. For example, MARO insists repeatedly that increased international
‘‘witness’’ and ‘‘transparency’’ of atrocities, through better surveillance and report-
ing, would deter perpetrators (35–36). That is possible. But the literature on moral
hazard reveals that sub-state actors sometimes rebel precisely because they expect
media reports of the state’s retaliation to compel intervention on their behalf.
If so, greater reporting of state atrocities would actually increase the incentive for
rebel provocations. It remains unclear, therefore, whether heightened ‘‘witness’’ of
atrocities would increase or decrease such violence.
Finally, MARO ’s prescriptions ignore a broad body of literature illustrating how
even purely humanitarian aid, such as food, water, sanitation, shelter, and medical
care, may exacerbate conflict.21 For example, militants often intermingle with civilians
in refugee camps, so the aid may sustain the rebels and inhibit their reintegration
into society, thereby prolonging fighting. Combatants sometimes intercept aid and
resell it or charge a tax for its safe delivery, helping to fund war. In some cases,
factions even fight each other to control delivery of aid, creating an extra incentive
for violence. Humanitarian aid also may damage the local economy by under-pricing
nearby merchants and producers, and it can delegitimate local political authorities
by providing better services than the government. In addition, aid organizations
often hire away the best-skilled local residents to serve as translators, drivers, or
office staff, draining the human capital necessary for entrepreneurship and good
governance. Unless such historical lessons are incorporated into military doctrine,
future interventions are likely to repeat the mistakes of the past.
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Military Doctrine Is Not Enough
The noble objective of reducing mass atrocities requires a multi-pronged strategy.
First, the international community should pursue preventive rather than pyromaniac
diplomacy. As noted above, states are most likely to perpetrate atrocities when con-
fronted with violent domestic threats to their rule. Thus, diplomacy should emphasize
consensual mediation, and carrots rather than sticks, to facilitate negotiated outcomes.
By contrast, coercing a state to hand over power or territory to a domestic challenger
is extremely dangerous because it heightens the risk that the state will resort to
atrocities to retain control.22 Diplomats should avoid such muscular mediation
unless they also take steps to avert the likely backlash—for example, by providing
soft landings for senior officials of the departing regime, or by pre-deploying a robust
peacekeeping force.23
Second, the United States and its allies should adopt criteria for intervention
that minimize moral hazard.24 Most importantly, they should refrain from helping
rebels on humanitarian grounds unless state retaliation is grossly disproportionate,
in order to provide both sides with an incentive to reduce violence. Interveners
should also deliver humanitarian aid in ways that minimize its benefit to rebels,
by guarding the supply routes and camps where assistance is provided to threatened
populations.
Third, the United States should structure and base its military forces in ways
that facilitate rapid reaction, because speed saves lives. Several ‘‘ultra-light’’ brigades
should be designed and equipped so that they can deploy and operate without
significant armor or heavy weapons in relatively permissive threat environments.
To further reduce deployment time, some units or at least their equipment should
be pre-positioned at bases in Africa, where mass atrocities are most likely to occur.
Finally, as MARO proposes, the United States and other like-minded states
should adopt military doctrine to stop atrocities. Yet, even here, caution is required.
Such routinization of intervention by itself could do more harm than good by further
emboldening rebels to provoke state retaliation in expectation of the benefits from the
humanitarian response. Only if properly embedded in a comprehensive strategy—
including enlightened diplomacy, strict intervention criteria, and well-designed
forces—would MARO ’s proposed doctrine contribute unambiguously to the protec-
tion of at-risk civilians and thereby help implement the emerging norm of the
Responsibility to Protect.
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